Monday 7th April 2014 at 10:40pm
1) As from 6 May 2014, if a worker wants to bring a claim to the Employment Tribunal they will be required, first of all, to go through ACAS early conciliation. If you haven’t had confirmation that the ACAS stage is complete – your ET1 claim will not be accepted.
2) The ACAS form is here: https://ec.acas.org.uk/Submission/Create
3) ACAS conciliation, unlike the ET1 / Tribunal process itself, is free. While there are many problems with it (see below), there may be some groups of workers who benefit from it – eg people who are unsure about bringing a claim, and merely wish to negotiate.
4) Make a note of the time and date when you send your claim to ACAS – this could be important later. Keep a copy of any receipt you get. If you haven’t had confirmation of receipt within 24 hours, re-send it, until you get confirmation.
5) After you have completed the form, ACAS should contact you, probably by telephone. The ACAS conciliation officer will use the call to ascertain what sort of claim you have, and what its very rough value might be.
6) You would be well advised to prepare for the call from ACAS, for example, by thinking through the one sentence which would best explain what your claim is about, and writing it down in advance. For example, “I have just been told I will be dismissed, and I want to bring a tribunal claim for unfair dismissal.” Or, “my employer owes me £200”. Or, “my manager has been bullying me and I think the reason for the bullying is my race”.
7) If you have a trade union, or a solicitor, you cannot name either on the ACAS form. ACAS will not know that you are represented until you tell them. That means that you would be well advised to have your representative’s number written down and at hand. You must tell ACAS the number, or ACAS will speak only to you and not to your representative.
8) From ACAS’s perspective, the sole purpose of their involvement will be to obtain an agreement between you and your employer that you will not bring a claim in return for your employer offering you a (modest) sum of money. If agreement is achieved, then from ACAS’s perspective, this is a “result”. If it is not achieved, then ACAS’ involvement will be a failure.
9) Because ACAS officers are under instructions to seek to obtain an agreement between you and your employer, you should be cautious about their involvement. If you don’t have a solicitor, and your employer does (and most employers will engage solicitors as soon as ACAS is involved), there is a real likelihood that the ACAS officer will find it easier to pressure you to make an agreement, and harder to put pressure on the employer’s solicitor (the solicitor will have been here more times before, will know what to say, and will be less amenable to pressure). Be cautious about making an agreement that will result in your claim being settled at an under-value. Agreements, once made, are not reversible. If in any doubt at all, speak to your union or to a solicitor before agreeing anything.
10) The ordinary time limit for a Tribunal claim is three months from the act about which you are complaining. If ACAS has your claim, and you do not reach agreement with your employer, your time will be extended, potentially, by up to a month. The best ways to make sure that ACAS’ involvement does not take your claim out of time are: a) involving ACAS early, at least a month before the three month deadline runs out, and b) making sure that you keep any documents showing when ACAS received your claim (in case there is a dispute later about when ACAS received your details), and c) making sure that you keep the documents showing when exactly ACAS’ involvement in your claim ended.
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Monday 24th March 2014 at 1:09pm
The following is based on some training I recently did for a trade union. I hope it will be useful for anyone who is just starting to become a caseworker and learning to accompany other workers at hearings of this sort.
PART 1: UNDERSTANDING DISCIPLINARY AND GRIEVANCE HEARINGS
What is a disciplinary meeting?
A disciplinary meeting is a meeting which has been requested by the employer, usually became a manager is thinking of taking disciplinary action against (i.e. punishing) a worker
What is a grievance meeting?
A grievance meeting is a meeting which has been requested by a worker, either became the worker wants his employer to take disciplinary action against a manager or another worker, or because the worker wants to complain about a decision taken by his employer
What is the relationship between discipline and dismissal?
If an employer wishes to dismiss a worker, then whatever the reason was for the dismissal, ordinarily, the employer should not take any action before first inviting the worker to a meeting.
If an employer wishes to dismiss a worker, there are in UK employment law only six fair reasons for dismissal: capability, conduct, redundancy, retirement, contravention of statute, some other substantial reason (section 98, Employment Rights Act, 1996).
o “Capability” is where a worker is incapable of doing their job, either because of illness or because they lack the skills to do it to the appropriate standard.
o “Conduct” is where a worker has done something wrong (eg stealing, fighting, persistent lateness or absence)
o “Redundancy” is where an employer has less need for a worker to carry out work of a particular kind or in a particular place (section 139, Employment Rights Act, 1996)
Some of these dismissals come about because the employer believes a worker has done something wrong and the employer is considering taking action against her. Those sorts of meetings are called disciplinary meetings.
If an employer wishes to punish a worker, there are two types of actions the employer can take: they can dismiss the worker, or they can subject them to a disciplinary penalty short of dismissal (eg a warning, or a demotion)
What should happen at a disciplinary or grievance hearing?
The answer will depend on what it says in the employer’s disciplinary or grievance procedure. Many employers publish their procedures on their website, and if your employer does not publish theirs, you should ask personnel for a copy of the policy as soon as you know that there is going to be a meeting.
Just for an example of a typical disciplinary procedure: see a London university’s procedure. Amongst other things, the procedure says:
· Many disciplinary problems will be dealt with informally (i.e. between the worker and the manager without a formal meeting). In an informal disciplinary action, the most the manager can do is give the worker an informal warning. If the manager is dealing with the complaint as if it were a formal procedure, at any time, the worker can stop him and say that the hearing should be dealt with formally (allowing them to be accompanied by a co-worker)
· If the process becomes formal then it will be in three stages:
· Stage 1 – investigation. A manager will investigate a complaint against a worker. The manager should report on the outcome of their investigation within 10 days of the complaint being made.
· Stage 2 – formal meeting. The worker should get at least 5 days notice of the meeting. They should be told who will be there from management and what punishments may be made. The worker should be told of their right to be accompanied at the meeting.
· At a formal meeting, the employer can make the following punishments: 1. formal oral warning, 2. first formal written warning, 3. first and final, or final, written warning. 4. dismissal.
· An employer should not dismiss, or give a first and final warning, unless the behaviour is so bad that it would justify immediate dismissal
· Stage 3 – appeal. The worker should appeal in writing. They will get a written response from the original investigating manager at least 5 days notice of the meeting. They should be told who will be there from management and what punishments may be made. The worker should be told of their right to be accompanied at the meeting.
Wherever you work, you should always familiarise yourself with your employer’s disciplinary procedure as it may contain rights which assist you, or the member you are accompanying. For example, the university’s procedure says the following about what trade union reps should or shouldn’t do at hearings. Unlike most employers, whose policies don’t allow for more than one rep, this particular policy does:
“In cases where dismissal may be a possible outcome or in complex cases, the employee may request to be accompanied by a second representative. Such a request should be made in writing to the Director of HR at least two working days in advance of the hearing and will be carefully considered by the School taking account of the particular circumstances of the case. Normally the role of the second representative will be to take notes unless agreed otherwise by the Director of Human Resources.”
Apart from my employer’s procedure, what other rules are there?
Some of the rules regarding disciplinary and grievance hearings are set out in primary legislation (i.e. Acts of Parliament).
Section 10 of the Employment Relations Act 1999 provides that:
Right to be accompanied.
(1) This section applies where a worker—
(a) is required or invited by his employer to attend a disciplinary or grievance hearing, and
(b) reasonably requests to be accompanied at the hearing.
(2) Where this section applies the employer must permit the worker to be accompanied at the hearing by a single companion who—
(a) is chosen by the worker and is within subsection (3),
(b) is to be permitted to address the hearing (but not to answer questions on behalf of the worker), and
(c) is to be permitted to confer with the worker during the hearing.
(3) A person is within this subsection if he is—
(a) employed by a trade union of which he is an official within the meaning of sections 1 and 119 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992,
(b) an official of a trade union (within that meaning) whom the union has reasonably certified in writing as having experience of, or as having received training in, acting as a worker’s companion at disciplinary or grievance hearings, or
(c) another of the employer’s workers.
(a) a worker has a right under this section to be accompanied at a hearing,
(b) his chosen companion will not be available at the time proposed for the hearing by the employer, and
(c) the worker proposes an alternative time which satisfies subsection (5), the employer must postpone the hearing to the time proposed by the worker.
(5) An alternative time must—
(a) be reasonable, and
(b) fall before the end of the period of five working days beginning with the first working day after the day proposed by the employer.
(6) An employer shall permit a worker to take time off during working hours for the purpose of accompanying another of the employer’s workers in accordance with a request under subsection (1)(b).
If you want to find this legislation in its original form then (in common with all the statutes referred to in these notes), it is on the www.legislation.gov.uk website
Some of the rules are contained in guidance provided by ACAS.
The ACAS guidance on disciplinary hearings provides that employers should
· Inform employees of problems
· Notify them of the need to attend a hearing and their right to be accompanied
· Inform them of their right to appeal
The procedure is very similar for dealing with employee’s grievances
You can read the ACAS guidance here
Where an employer or a worker does not comply with the ACAS guidance, and the worker subsequently brings a Tribunal claim which succeeds, the Tribunal may increase or reduce the award by up to 25% (section 207A Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992)
o Is it appropriate for an employer to deal with poor attendance by a disabled worker under a disciplinary procedure?
o Should the same procedures be followed if the employer’s misconduct complaint is about a trade union representative?
o If the worker makes a grievance about a decision to dismiss her, should it be conducted under the disciplinary or grievance procedures?
o What if the worker’s rep is on holiday for 5 days and the employer says: “I am not rescheduling the disciplinary hearing?”
o What if the employer says “you can have a colleague to take notes but I’m not allowing them to speak at your disciplinary hearing”?
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Friday 14th March 2014 at 11:33am
Most of my readers will have picked up, either from the various legal update services who have already covered this story or from the reports in the press, that the latest Tribunal figures, released yesterday, show that ET claims have fallen sharply, following the introduction of fees in July 2013.
I thought it would be useful to look beneath the headline figures, which have typically been reported as a fall of 63% (individual claims) or 79% (total claims), to show which jurisdictions are hanging together, and which ones aren’t.
The following table shows in the left hand column, the decline in the number of cases brought in December 2013 and December 2012; in the middle column, the number of cases brought in that jurisdiction in December 2012 (i.e. their numbers in a typical month, pre-fees); and in the right hand column, the jurisdiction:
-90% 1,606 Redundancy – failure to inform & consult
-86% 776 Written statement of terms & conditions
-83% 1,760 Sex Discrimination
-82% 989 Redundancy pay
-80% 1,825 Equal pay
-77% 2,708 Breach of contract
-74% 638 Disability discrimination
-72% 4,425 Unfair dismissal
-71% 100 Written pay statement
-70% 3,108 Unauthorised deduction from wages (formerly wages act)
-67% 68 Written statement of reasons for dismissal
-66% 64 Discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation
-66% 2,708 Working time directive
-61% 214 Age Discrimination
-60% 381 Race Discrimination
-59% 65 Discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief
-53% 104 Transfer of an undertaking – failure to inform & consult
-48% 31 National minimum wage
-41% 108 Suffer a detriment/unfair dismissal – pregnancy
-38% 54 Part time workers regulations
The first thing to note is that the fall has been sharpest in the jurisdiction which involve the most claims: if you were a lawyer thinking “I can reinvent myself as a specialist in part-time workers’ claims”, clearly that won’t work – they may be holding up better than the average but there are too few of them to make a difference
Next, if you separate out the jurisdictions which indicate group claims (i.e. single cases involving perhaps hundreds or thousands of joined litigants, which take up a tiny proportion of the system’s net time but have distorted the Tribunal figures over the past few years) – they have declined very sharply in numbers, giving the impression that the working time claims in aviation and the equal pay / sex discrimination claims in local government and housing have in essence become historic – all or almost all were issued prior to fees coming in, last July, and they won’t appear in future years. This alone will reduce the statistical number of claims dramatically, even if it won’t make much difference at all to 99% of Judges, lawyers, Claimants or Respondents.
I had expected wages and similar claims to fall fastest, as fees have been set so high that the Tribunal regime is punitively unattractive (who would spend £390 chasing a debt of less than £500, especially when even if the Claimant succeeds, Claimant’s recovery rates are below 50%). This has happened to some extent – witness the cluster of redundancy claims and breach of contract near the top of the pile.
I had hoped though that unfair dismissal would decline less sharply – maybe by around 60% post-fees: it is the bread and butter of the Tribunal system, and has some the same problem as wages (who would spent £1300 chasing a likely award, if successful, and if compensation is ordered, of a median £4500 or so?) but to a lesser extent.
The real surprise is discrimination. At a decline of “just” 61% and 60%, age race discrimination cases (the only numerically significant groups of claims to be holding up at all) show what one Employment Judge told me recently, “all our one five day cases are still in the diary, it’s the one day cases which have vanished”.
But look at sex and disability discrimination with their much sharper falls of 84% and 74% – these are even worse, and much worse, than even I had feared, and I have been among the greatest pessimists.
If you take two steps back and look at the picture as a whole, what you see is Claimants, in all jurisdictions, with winnable cases (remember: 3/5 of all Tribunal claims succeed), voting with their feet, and concluding that fees have taken the Tribunal decisively out of the reach and that there is no justice for them.
And this is before we get compulsory Acas conciliation in April 2014: which will almost certainly result in a further chunk of 60-70% or so of all cases coming out of the Tribunal system.
If workers were getting anything in return it might not be so bad – but they are not – this is a significant defeat for everyone at work. And the only hope will be if workers find alternative ways of obtaining justice, by putting pressure, directly, on their employers.
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Monday 10th March 2014 at 8:00am
Or, everything, you need to know about employment law in just 40 minutes
(Me speaking to students at Glasgow Kelvin college, earlier this year)
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Monday 3rd March 2014 at 8:00am
Twenty years ago, one of the buzzwords of industrial sociology was the idea of “flexibility”. The workplaces of the digital future, optimists said, would contain large numbers of highly-skilled workers, well remunerated and able to work short hours. At the start of any week, they would choose the employers for whom they intended to work and the days they would work. Pessimists warned that if the employers had their way, they would choose workers from workplaces scattered across all the continents, engaged in insecure, low-paid work with no underlying rights.
The different hopes and fear of workers and employers shaped the press’ discovery in autumn of last year that there are between 250,000 (Office for National Statistics) and 5,500,000 (according to the trade union UNITE) workers on zero-hour contracts in the UK. Under these contracts, a worker remaining on the employer’s books is offered duties every week. In contrast to most workers, who have a fixed working week, there is no obligation to offer, or indeed pay, any minimum number of hours.
Zero-hour contracts may sound like self-employment but the worker is under the same degree of control and subordination a full-time employee. Unlike self-employed contractors, a zero-hours worker is subject to the employer’s disciplinary, conduct and absence procedures.
What this means in practice is that the “flexibility” of the arrangement goes only in one direction. According to ONS, 42% of all zero hour workers, are given less than 12 hour notice of their shifts. If a worker is contacted on a Sunday evening and asked “are you free to work on Monday and Thursday afternoons this week?”, and answers “No”, then there is a real risk the employer will never contact them again.
Because of the irregularity of their hours, zero hour workers rarely receive holiday or sickness pay, maternity rights or pensions.
One sector in which zero hours contracts are prevalent is social care, where the typical underlying relationships might be something like the following: a local authority provides care services to a shifting group of 200 or so elderly patients living in the community. It contracts out the care provision, which was once provided by council employees, to a private company. The identity of the patients will change from week to week, as their health gets worse or better, and new people require care. Using zero hours contracts enables the private company to pass on to their workers the insecurity structured into their relationship with the patients.
The Coalition government, noticing a large number of press stories about zero hour contracts, is now consulting about legislative change. The best thing would be to abolish these contracts altogether. A minimum reform would be to insist that a flexible contract (“your duties may change from week to week”) must pay a minimum number of paid hours, which might be as low as 8 per week (i.e. a full working day). This would at least give workers some protection from complete abuse, and the cost to employers would be modest (after all, what is the point of employing someone, with all the difficulty of putting them through your PAYE systems, etc, if you are not going to offer them as little as a single day’s work per week?)
Rather than do this, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) has limited its consultation to the issues of “exclusivity” and “transparency”.
By exclusivity, what is meant is that a contract might at present say “you are obliged to make yourself available to the employer 40 hours per week, while the employer is under no obligation to offer or pay you for any work at all”. Such clauses pay havoc with workers lives, their ability to get another job, their benefits entitlement, etc.
BIS’ own figures suggest that less than 10% of zero hours contacts have an exclusivity clause. This sounds reassuring but is misleading: the assumption of exclusivity is implicit in the zero-hour contract and there is no need to make it explicit. Most employers don’t formally dismiss a zero hours worker who does not make themselves available to work. An employer can achieve just as much without dismissal by no longer offering the employee work. There is no dismissal, so (in principle) the employee cannot sue. If the worker did persuade a Tribunal that they had been dismissed, their compensation might be nothing, as the employer would say “but there was no guarantee of work and the usual hours were a mere zero”.
BIS offers a range options for dealing with the problem of exclusivity ranging from an outright ban to positive encouragement and invites comments. Reading between the lines, it is most likely that they will do nothing to limit the terms but issue a Code of Practice as to how they might be interpreted.
That the Coalition is minded to propose such a Code is apparent from their second area of consultation, “transparency”. BIS notes that a large number of workers are unsure whether they are on a zero-hour contract or not, and proposes including within a Code of Practice a model zero-hour employment clause. It is hard to resist the feeling that the real purpose of this Consultation is to put zero hour contracts on a firmer foundation and to make them if anything more common in future.
(reprinted from Socialist Lawyer, March 2014)
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Monday 24th February 2014 at 8:00am
Employment law requires, for its successful operation, its knowledge by hundreds of thousands of non-lawyers. Any large employer will have a personnel department, staffed by the company’s in-house legal experts. On the employee side, there may well an equal number of informal or formal employees’ representatives. A dispute may arise about (for example) whether the employer is entitled to offer its full-term employees just 4 weeks’ holiday per year. The answer will be initially in the employees’ contract, but if the employees are dissatisfied with the answer they find there, attention will generally turn next whether the contractual provision is lawful. To know the answer, you have to know what it says in “employment law”.
Many of us who in practice in this area forget all too easily how little opportunity any of these people have to refresh their knowledge of the law. No-one working in the personnel department will be a lawyer; all will be expected to keep up to date with employment law. Even if the employee representatives are trade union representatives (and, at present, only a minority of workplaces have a union rep) and belong to a recognised trade union with “facility time” (paid time off) for some of their duties; almost certainly, these days, the reps will not be given permission to attend training or refresher courses in the law. In a small company, of course, it is perfectly usual for there to be no-one, whether employer or employee, familiar even with simplest rules of employment law: such as whether a written contract is necessary, or whether wages may be lawfully deducted for poor performance…
As a non-lawyer, how are you supposed to be certain that an employer’s decision complies with the law? Many non-lawyers think the answer can be approximated by purchasing a good, detailed textbook published by an authoritative source. But if you spend any time among employment lawyers, you will see that few of us possess or (fewer still) read such a book. There are various reasons why not:
One, superficial, reason for our dislike of law books is our consciousness that employment law is always changing. What the books specialise in is summarising decisions which appeal courts make about how the law should be interpreted (“caselaw”). But the decisions of caselaw are constantly changing with the result that what is said in any one book is constantly of being out of date and therefore wrong.
Let me give a practical example of how this can happen. In 2013, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) was faced with a decision as to how to interpret parts of the Equality Act 2010 which prohibit an employer from punishing an employee who has been associated with a complaint (or in the technical language “victimisation”). What happens if the relationship has ended? Section 108 of the Act makes it unlawful for the employer to punish a former employee. But subsection 7 of sub-section 8 says that, “(7) … conduct is not a contravention of this section in so far as it also amounts to victimisation of B by A”. On 5 March 2013, handing down the decision in Rowstock Ltd v Jessemey  UKEAT 0112/12, Mr Recorder QC sitting as a Judge in the EAT held that on the plain meaning of these words, Parliament had not given ex-employees protection against victimisation. Then on 1 May 2013, in Onu v Akwiwu  UKEAT 0022_12_0105the Honourable Justice Langstaff sitting as a Judge in the EAT held that on the plan meaning of the same words, Parliament had given ex-employees protection against victimisation.
Now imagine that you were a learned author of an annual textbook whose publication deadline was the first week of April (to coincide with the new tax year: this is not an uncommon date). Vigilant to report the law exactly as it is, you find yourself holding back the final page proofs of your book until the beginning of March. In 2013, you find that by holding back until March, you have had the good fortune to sneak in one last case. Confidently, you begin the relevant paragraph by saying, “An employee is not protected after their dismissal against victimisation” and cite as proof the decision in Rowstock. Within weeks, your text is ruined. You were accurate when you published it; since Onu the law (or, more accurately, its interpretation) has moved on.
If anyone reading this possesses their own law library I would advise them to try the modest experiment of reading all your books and looking for the dates on which they were published. If you can’t find a date, that is a small but telling imprecision on the author’s part and a sign that the book is worth less than you might hope. If you can find a date and it is more than a year, do remind yourself of how few weeks passed between Rowstock and Onu, and reflect how much chance there has been for the interpretation of the law, in whatever area most concerns you, to move on.
There is a second, much more profound reason, why lawyers distrust textbooks. When non-lawyers think about employment law, they tend to assume that the answer is found in decisions of the courts. So to give you an example, and, this is a query I have been asked in the last few weeks. “Does employment law protect a council employee who stands for local elected office, from dismissal or detriment, if they say something which could be taken to be prejudicial to their employer?” The scenario, if you think about it, is obviously one which is likely to occur. A person who wants to be elected to a council is likely to say that the previous councillors have acted badly in their post. If the candidate does not think that, then why is she standing? But anything robust she says is capable of being taken, by an unsympathetic manager, as prejudicial to the good name of the council for which she works. Yet even though we might expect this difference of interests to have generated case law, as far as I have been able to tell from a quick search, there never has been any such case.
So if this situation was to arise in real life, lawyers would be dealing with it from what we consider first principles. Section 98 Employment Rights Act 1996 only allows very few fair reasons for dismissal: conduct, capability, retirement, redundancy, some other substantial reason. An employee dismissed for what they said during an election campaign would say that their words do not come within this short list or that, if they did, they should not be treated as “misconduct” which is the only one into which the situation could be fitted. Alternatively, the employee might say that the reason for their treatment was their political opinions or belief, and that this was unlawful direct discrimination contrary to section 13 Equality Act 2010. In neither case, would there be much caselaw to go on, and a Tribunal would find itself focussing carefully on the plain, ordinary words of the relevant statutes.
Even in the case of post-employment detriment, while the effect of the decision in Onu was to reverse the decision in Rowstock, both of these cases were about the interpretation of statute. Case-law might shift the interpretation of language one way or another, but in the first and in the last resort all we have are the words of the main employment statutes – these, not case-law, determine whether claims in victory or defeat.
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Monday 17th February 2014 at 8:00am
At the end of July 2013, the government introduced fees for Employment Tribunal cases. The fees were alien to employment law and set at a high level. Combined hearing and issuing fees of £390 (for a wages claim) or £1200 (unfair dismissal or discrimination) compare for example to just £465 or £670 for a hearing in the Court of Appeal (depending on whether permission was granted in advance or not). Or to give another comparison: the median award in 2012-2013 for an unfair dismissal and a race discrimination case were £4382 and £4381 respectively.
Given that roughly half of all dismissal cases and one in six race discrimination cases succeed at final hearings, and given that less than half of all losing employers pay in full within six months, the government’s barely-disguised intention was to dissuade workers (irrespective of the strengths of their claims) from bringing them, by the simple expedient of making it financially unrealistic for claims to reach the Tribunal. Workers are being penalised for bringing claims with the blunt intention of reducing the number of cases, and with disregard to the opportunities this provide for injustice.
Have the measures succeeded; since July have claims gone up or down?
Buried in the figures for July to September 2013 is just enough data to work out roughly what the impact of Tribunal fees has been. We can compare those figures to a year ago, to see what effect fees have had.
|Total claims accepted||47614 (J-S 2012)||38963 (J-S 2013)|
Obviously, I have only selected a few of the jurisdictions, but enough I hope to illustrate the trends. The number of cases of unfair dismissal, the bread and butter of the tribunal, has fallen by roughly two-fifths. Wages claims have also fallen, except more slowly (roughly a quarter). And race discrimination slower still (roughly a sixth: other discrimination claims are within the same bracket).
I’ve included the Working Time cases just to give a sense of the total picture – to explain why the overall fall in the number of ET claims (c20%) is slower than the fall in unfair dismissal (c40%, which is surprising when unfair dismissal takes up so much court time). In fact the working time cases (whose numbers have held up) are insignificant. Essentially it is a single “group” case brought by just one union involving many air line pilots which requires to be reissued periodically.
To pause and repeat, I am speaking here of July to September 2013. In July there were no fees, in August and September there were. The year-on-year comparison only shows two-thirds of the effect that should be apparent if we were to compare a fully post-quarter with a year ago.
So – as a very rough estimate – my prediction is that fees will result in an overall reduction of 50% or so of all Tribunal cases, with there being a sharper fall even that that in unfair dismissal (probably 60% or so), and a slower but still significant reduction in the number of discrimination cases (probably 1 in 4 when the dust settles).
The really interesting thing will be what happens when Claimants’ collective consciousness catches up with the enormity of fees.
It is possible that after a sharp “one off” reduction in the caseload, the numbers then increase again (this happened after the statutory disciplinary procedures were introduced a decade ago).
My own anxiety is that we will see the numbers continuing to fall, year on year, as the word gets out in many workplaces (especially in non-union workplaces where there is no-one else to pay the Claimant’s fee for them) that it is never worth claiming – the cost is now prohibitively expensive. The word may well go out that the Tribunal is simply no longer an option.
IE we could well see a dynamic akin to what happened in legal aid after the “scope” changes in April 2013, so that people who might have been eligible for legal aid simply assume that they are not, and that there is no legal aid available and don’t even taken their cases to solicitors. And that what government perhaps intended to be a “shallow” reduction in case numbers of say 30% or so, will turn out to have an even worse impact than we critics predicted.
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Wednesday 3rd July 2013 at 6:00am
Some twelve months ago, I published a book “Struck Out” analysing the Employment Tribunal system that the Coalition government had inherited, and which has since been subject to dramatic change. My argument was, in brief, that the supposed flaws on which the press focussed (and which in turn have justified the changes we all know about) were in fact mythical. Rather than foisting employers with a proliferation of speculative claims, a majority of Tribunal claimants succeeded in proving that there had been unfair dismissal, or unlawful deductions of wages, etc. Rather than paying huge sums, the values of Tribunal victories were by any standard trivial. Workers who succeeded routinely leave the Tribunals with awards amounting to a tiny fraction of their actual loss. These flaws, I suggested, could be traced back to the policy discussions within the Donovan Commission, from which the Tribunal system draws its root. Or, they illustrated a tension in the earliest years of the Tribunal, between its relatively benign, statutory context, and the deeper common law traditions to which the Tribunal’s jurisprudence was quickly assimilated.
The Industrial Law Journal termed my proposals to increase the prevalence of reinstatement orders “controversial”, while otherwise welcoming the book. The book had a positive review in International Socialism, Labour Briefing, Tribune, Socialist Review, etc. The New Law Journal was a little more sceptical, suggesting that my desire for the deformalisation of the system was “deliberately provocative”: “times have changed and are not likely to change back.” On their analysis of the future direction of change, sadly, the NLJ reviewers were most certainly right.
The most analytical review appeared on a website Review 31, where I was criticised for blaming the system’s ills on certain default practices of the common law tradition (including a particular kind of contractual analysis, a deference to certain kinds of witness testimony, an unwillingness to order employers to carry out reinstatement…). The reviewer, Simon Berhman, replied: “the relative flexibility of the common law allows pressure more easily to be brought to bear from outside the law to achieve change, a process that is often much harder in countries where altering the constitution or the civil code is a laborious and lengthy process. It is at least arguable, therefore, that the common law offers a far less juridified set-up than that of civil law.” Behrman rejected any hint that the civil law tradition practised in Europe might be inherently more susceptible to workers’ rights: “While I hold no brief for the common law, the argument that rights enshrined in a constitution in themselves offer greater equality is a liberal fiction that in practice serves only to obscure the existing gross inequalities that exist in society.”
It certainly hadn’t been my intention to suggest that the legal system of (say) France or Germany or even constitutional South Africa were naturally more socialist than our precedent-based system. Rather, by focussing on the common law, my purpose was to try to get at something which I find missing in most legal analysis. In other words, an explanation for how it is that the law feels like it does, how it is that Judges can make bad decisions (and what is it, anyway, that makes a decision bad?). I wanted to explain how it is for example that a Claimant (a worker) who puts in their Claim form late can expect the most robust refusal of their Claim, whereas a Respondent (an employer) who engages with proceedings for the first time only months after they were required to will inevitably be allowed in to defend the case.
I was interested in other words in the subtle class privileges of the law, and I focussed on the common law (i.e. the deep patterns of judicial intervention) as this is the actual point, I believed, rather than anything asymmetrical about the statutory provisions, where the unequal treatment of workers and employers came in.
Of course, since 2010, the Coalition has been busy disturbing the formal symmetry of employment law, requiring one side only (impecunious workers) to pay fees, introducing one-sided privilege of employer’s dismissal conversations, etc. But these principles offend deep against the warp and weft of ordinary law. There is no need to persuade any reader of this magazine they are wrong.
The “big point” I was making was that subtle class privilege is a feature of litigation; or, to put it another way, that the problems are as often in Judges as they are in Parliament. There is no reason why this argument should be relevant only to employment lawyers. It is just as pressing when you ask a Judge to suspend an eviction, and the Judge refuses to do so because the family has been wasting its income on a satellite television subscription; or when care proceedings begin with social services’ reports of the parents’ chaotic and untidy homes…
This article was first published in the June 2013 edition of Socialist Lawyer magazine. The same issue also contains articles by Michael Mansfield, Anna Morris, Wendy Pettifer and many others. The magazine is sent to all members of the Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers. Membership rates start at £20 per year.
Readers can buy Struck Out with a 30% discount and free UK P&P by entering the code ‘PLUSTRUCK’ at http://www.plutobooks.com/page/promo
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Tuesday 30th April 2013 at 9:00am
The Coalition has now published the Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal Fees Order 2013, the secondary legislation under which fees will take effect.
Fees remain at the punitive levels on which the Government consulted: £390 for the issuing and hearing of a wages claim, or a claim for a redundancy payment, or for certain types of simple, but unusual hearings (eg applications for time off to care for a dependent); £1200 for the issuing and hearing of an unfair dismissal or discrimination claim, £1600 for an appeal.
The government has not taken this opportunity to clarify when fees will be introduced, which remains the vague, official deadline of “summer 2013″. Employment law advisers will know that there is a likely to be a rush by claimants to “beat the deadline”, whenever it is set. The government, presumably, seeks to frustrate any last-minute surge by keeping back the date for as long as possible.
There is nothing in these Regulations about when the hearing fee will be payable, or what the sanctions will be for non-payment (discretionary vs automatic strike-out); presumably the answer will appear in the new Tribunal rules, whenever they appear.
There is nothing in these Regulations about reinstating a claim wrongly struck out for non-payment.
And there is nothing in these Regulations about how to pay: at one point the impression was that all claims would be required to be started online by paying a fee, but the government no longer seems to be insisting on that. This is probably for the best Tribunals (unlike courts) do not have tills, counter staff, etc. Most lawyers, whoever they act for, are cautious about requiring claimants (many of whom are unrepresented, have only a hazy sense of Tribunal procedures, etc) to pay online. This just seems to be ripe with possibilities for injustice. Yet the alternative, of allowing payments at the Tribunal, would have its own problems…
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Monday 29th April 2013 at 1:23pm
What is the point of employment law? Should you try to work out an answer to the question through the changes which the Coalition government has been making in 2012 and 2013, the first thing you would conclude is that the law exists to rewrite industrial relations to the benefit of employers at the expense of workers.
No “reform” illustrates this better than the changes which are being made to dismissal procedures, starting from this summer, to prevent a tribunal from enquiring about the conversations between employer and employee in the run-up to dismissal. Where an employer proposes that an employee should consent to their own dismissal, this will be deemed a “protected conversation”. If the negotiations break down and the employee maintains afterwards that the employer said something crucial to their dismissal that shines a bright light on the unfairness of all that followed and all that came before, the Tribunal will not be entitled to enquire what it was that the employer said. The proposal is in fact even worse than this makes it sound. The “protection” only operates in one direction. Should the employer want to rely on his own words later – for example, because he made a cash offer to the worker, which the worker failed to beat in subsequent litigation – this will not be protected. The employer can tell the Tribunal, and the Tribunal could perfectly easily take this into account when deciding for example who should pay the costs of the litigation.
Me for New Left Project. More here.